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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
We granted Lawrence L. Simmons' request for a
certificate of probable cause and now must decide: (1) whether
voir dire transcripts, missing after a 13-year delay between
Simmons' sentencing and direct appeal, are indispensable to
review his claim that the prosecution improperly exercised its
peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from the jury,
and (2) whether this delay violated Simmons' constitutional right
to due process and a speedy appeal.1

The district court denied

Simmons' reopened petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

We will

reverse because, although the district court correctly concluded
that Simmons' right to due process was violated, it erred by
concluding that the violation was cured when Simmons received his
direct appeal.
I.
In 1977, Simmons was sentenced to life imprisonment
plus 21 to 25 years.

Although immediately after sentencing he

expressed his desire to appeal, and never waived his right to
appeal, Simmons' conviction and sentence were not reviewed for 13
years.

His appointed trial counsel did not file a notice of

appeal or promptly transfer Simmons' case to the appellate
1

. Simmons additionally asserts claims based on alleged
violations of his Miranda and Fifth Amendment rights, inability
to review the effect of pre-trial publicity, governmental
misconduct, verdicts against the weight of the evidence, errors
in the jury instructions, other errors during trial, and the
denial of his motions to examine the jurors and for a new trial.
We have reviewed these claims and conclude that they are without
merit.

division of the New Jersey Public Defender.

Thereafter, despite

requests from Simmons and his trial counsel, the Public Defender
failed to promptly seek an appeal.

Ultimately, the federal

district court granted Simmons a conditional writ of habeas
corpus, directing that a writ would issue unless the state gave
him an appeal or a new trial.

Thus, after he had pursued

collateral review in the state and federal courts from 1980 to
1988, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division finally
permitted Simmons to file a notice of appeal nunc pro tunc.
After spending more than a decade in prison, Simmons was granted
his first appeal as of right.
By this time, however, portions of the trial record
including a lengthy in camera voir dire of prospective jurors
were missing.

The Appellate Division remanded the case for the

limited purpose of reconstructing the record, and the judges who
had presided over the jury selection and the remainder of the
trial and sentencing held reconstruction hearings.

Simmons

challenged the sufficiency of the reconstructed record in federal
district court, but his motion was denied without prejudice to
his right to challenge the record in the state appellate
proceedings.

In 1990, the Appellate Division affirmed Simmons'

conviction and sentence, and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied
his petition for certification.

In 1991, the United States

Supreme Court denied Simmons' petition for a writ of certiorari.
The district court then denied his reopened petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, and he now appeals.
II.

Simmons contends that the manner in which the
prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenges violated the
federal and state law principles articulated in Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), and State v.
Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150 (N.J. 1986).

In Batson, the United States

Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids the prosecution from exercising
peremptory challenges to exclude potential petit jurors based on
race or race-based assumptions.
1719.

476 U.S. at 89, 106 S. Ct. at

Similarly, in Gilmore, the New Jersey Supreme Court held

that its state constitution prohibits the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges "to remove potential petit jurors who are
members of a cognizable group on the basis of their presumed
group bias."

511 A.2d at 1154.

Before analyzing the merits of

Simmons' peremptory challenge claim, we must resolve two
preliminary issues:

(1) whether Batson and Gilmore apply to this

case, and (2) whether Simmons' claim is barred under the
"adequate and independent state ground" doctrine.2
A.
In Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 106 S. Ct. 2878 (1986)
(per curiam), the Court concluded that Batson does not apply
retroactively on collateral review of a final conviction.
258, 106 S. Ct. at 2879.

2

Id. at

In Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,

. The parties do not dispute and our review reveals that
Simmons properly exhausted his peremptory challenge claim, and
speedy appeal claim, in the state courts. See Rose v. Lundy, 455
U.S. 509, 518-20, 102 S. Ct. 1198, 1203-04 (1982).

107 S. Ct. 708 (1987), however, the Court held that Batson does
apply "to litigation pending on direct state or federal review or
not yet final when Batson was decided."
at 709.

Id. at 316, 107 S. Ct.

It reasoned that the integrity of judicial review

requires consistent application of "our best understanding of
governing constitutional principles," id. at 323, 107 S. Ct. at
713 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679, 91 S.
Ct. 1160, 1173 (1971)), and fairness requires allegiance to "the
principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same."
Id.
Here, Simmons' 1977 conviction did not become final
until 1991 when the United States Supreme Court denied his
petition for a writ of certiorari.

See Allen, 478 U.S. at 258

n.1, 106 S. Ct. at 2880 n.1 (citation omitted).

Although this

case was before the Supreme Court in 1982, in conjunction with
Simmons' efforts to get a direct appeal, it did not then become
final in the relevant sense.

Simmons' first appeal as of right

was the critical missing step, and his intervening applications
for collateral review did not render his conviction final.

See

Caspari v. Bohlen, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S. Ct. 948, 953 (1994).
Accordingly, the Batson decision, announced in 1986, applies to
this case.
The irony is that the egregious delay in granting
Simmons a direct appeal inadvertently gave him the benefit of the
Batson decision.

Had Simmons received a timely review, his

conviction would have been final before 1986.
a "chance beneficiary" of the Batson rule.

In a sense, he is

See Griffith, 479

U.S. at 323, 107 S. Ct. at 713.

Simmons, however, was not

similarly situated with other defendants convicted in 1977 whose
convictions became final before Batson was decided.

Those other

defendants did not suffer a 13-year delay before getting
appellate review, and we see no reason to bend the rule in
Griffith to deny Simmons the constitutional protection afforded
in Batson.
B.
The Gilmore court itself delineated its holding's rule
of application:
[T]he new rule will apply to this defendant, trials in
which the jury selection commenced on or after the date
of the Appellate Division opinion [which was affirmed
in Gilmore], and cases now on appeal in which the issue
was preserved in the trial court and the record is
adequate to raise the issue.
511 A.2d at 1169.

Applying these instructions, the Appellate

Division rejected Simmons' contention that the reconstructed
trial record was insufficient to permit it to review his Gilmore
claim.

It held that Simmons' argument "must of necessity fail

because we consider this to be attempting a retroactive
application of Gilmore under the procedural history and
circumstances of this case."3
3

The Appellate Division's opinion

. The Appellate Division noted in passing that Simmons had
filed no objections to the reconstructed record in the state
trial court. Before the reconstruction hearings, however, the
district court expressly granted Simmons permission to seek its
ruling on the adequacy question. Simmons, in fact, challenged
the sufficiency of the record in the district court, but his
motion was denied "without prejudice to petitioner's right to
raise these issues in the state appellate proceedings and in any
future federal habeas corpus petition following exhaustion of
state remedies." We will not presume a procedural default or

yields three potential justifications for this conclusion:
(1) since Simmons' direct appeal followed his applications for
collateral review, it was not legitimately "on appeal" for
purposes of applying Gilmore retroactively, (2) the Gilmore issue
was not sufficiently "preserved in the trial court," and (3) the
reconstructed record was not "adequate to raise the issue," and
the resulting prejudice was appropriately assigned to Simmons.
Although its specific rationale was not plainly stated,
the Appellate Division clearly rendered a decision based on state
law grounds which was later affirmed by the state supreme court.
Simmons had also raised a Batson claim in his direct appeal,
stating in his brief that "the rule of Batson is applicable to
the case at bar," but the Appellate Division did not address the
Batson issue.

It relied solely on state law authority and based

its decision to reject Simmons' peremptory challenge claim on
Gilmore.

"[I]t is a well-established principle of federalism

that a state decision resting on an adequate foundation of state
substantive law is immune from review in the federal courts,"
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2503 (1977)
(citations omitted), and we lack jurisdiction to overrule the
Appellate Division's conclusion that Gilmore does not apply
retroactively to Simmons' case.

See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller,

296 U.S. 207, 210, 56 S. Ct. 183, 184 (1935) ("where the judgment
of a state court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal
(..continued)
waiver because Simmons apparently relied on the district court's
assurances.

and the other nonfederal in character, our jurisdiction fails if
the nonfederal ground is independent of the federal ground and
adequate to support the judgment").
C.
Next, we consider whether the Appellate Division's
dismissal of Simmons' Gilmore claim bars consideration of his
Batson claim under the "adequate and independent state ground"
doctrine.

Although Simmons raised a Batson claim in his reopened

petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the district court only
analyzed the Appellate Division's dismissal under Gilmore.
Simmons v. Arvonio, 796 F. Supp. 777, 790 (D.N.J. 1992).

The

district court concluded that this dismissal was not reviewable
because it was based on substantive state law and disposed of
Simmons' peremptory challenge claim.
at 81, 97 S. Ct. at 2503).

Id. (citing Sykes, 433 U.S.

For the following reasons, we

conclude that the district court erred.
In Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S. Ct. 2546
(1991), the Court reiterated that it "will not review a question
of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that
court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the
federal question and adequate to support the judgment."
729, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-54.

Id. at

Here, the Appellate Division's

judgment on Simmons' state Gilmore claim was clearly
"independent" of his federal Batson claim.

The court cited no

federal case law and did not refer to the Fourteenth Amendment or
Batson decision in concluding that Gilmore did not apply
retroactively to Simmons' case.

Moreover, the Gilmore court

explicitly based its decision "on the New Jersey Constitution,
which protects fundamental rights independently of the United
States Constitution."

511 A.2d at 1157.4

The Appellate

Division's decision under Gilmore, however, was not "adequate" to
support its judgment.

The unavailability of a state

constitutional claim is not dispositive as to the availability or
merits of an analogous federal constitutional claim:
[T]he federal habeas petitioner who claims he is
detained pursuant to a final judgment of a state court
in violation of the United States Constitution is
entitled to have the federal habeas court make its own
independent determination of this federal claim without
being bound by the determination on the merits of that
claim reached in the state proceedings.
Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87, 97 S. Ct. at 2506-07.
If the Appellate Division had explicitly addressed and
dismissed
Simmons' Batson
claim based on
its analysis of
federal law,
then this claim
would clearly
be subject to
federal habeas
4

. Although the protections afforded under Batson and Gilmore
are overlapping, the two cases rest on different foundations.
See Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 859 (3d Cir. 1994)
(recognizing dual protection of New Jersey and federal
constitutions); State v. Bey, 610 A.2d 814, 827 (N.J. 1992)
(same).

review.

For

example, if it
had dismissed
both the
Gilmore and
Batson claims
on state and
federal
retroactivity
grounds, then
its judgment
regarding the
retroactive
application of
Batson would be
subject to
review.
Conversely, if
the Appellate
Division had
ruled that
Simmons waived
his Batson
claim based on
state
procedural law,
then its

judgment would
be immune from
federal review.
But, dismissing
a state
constitutional
claim on state
law grounds
does not
preclude
federal habeas
review of a
parallel
federal
constitutional
claim.
III.
A.
The first issue is whether Simmons' Batson claim is
preserved for review.

During the reconstruction hearings,

Simmons' trial counsel testified as follows:
Q:
Do you recall making a motion for mistrial on the basis
that the State was improperly excluding blacks on the
basis of race?
A:

Again, I cannot say with certainty that I made such a
motion. I don't have an independent recollection of
it. I probably would have given the flavor and the
context of this case, et cetera, that I would have made
such a motion. Although, I cannot say that I -- I
can't say, categorically, that I did. I probably did,
but I can't say that.

In response to a question about the timing of the motion, he
stated that:

"I don't have an independent recollection, but I

would think that I definitely made it before the jury was sworn.
I would not make it after the fact."
that:

Finally, counsel attested

"At that time I was making the motion, not in every case,

but I recall making a motion for a systematic exclusion by the
State in several other cases during that period of time."
The assistant prosecutor's testimony is not to the
contrary. He testified as follows:
Q:
Do you recall the defense making a motion for a
mistrial charging that the State systematically
excluded black jurors?
A:

No. I believe that that happened, after reviewing
notes that Judge Marchese made, but without having
reviewed those notes, I would have no recollection of
that occurring.

Although the notes of the judge who presided over the voir dire,
Judge Leopizzi, do not refer to a defense motion based on
systematic exclusion, the file of the judge who presided over the
trial and sentencing, Judge Marchese, includes the following
notation:

"Defense motion for mistrial charging State with

systematically excluding blacks from jury.

Leopizzi denied."

The court clerk's records indicate that defense counsel made
several motions for a mistrial before the jury was sworn,
although they do not specify the grounds for these motions.
Based on this record, we are satisfied that Simmons' Batson claim
was preserved for appeal.
B.

Having asserted a claim that the prosecution based its
peremptory challenges on race, Simmons had the burden of
establishing a prima facie case.
three steps:

A Batson analysis proceeds in

(1) the defendant must make a prima facie showing

of a violation, (2) if the defendant succeeds, the prosecution
must articulate a race-neutral explanation, and (3) the trial
court must then determine whether the defendant has proven
purposeful discrimination.

See United States v. Uwaezhoke, 995

F.2d 388, 392 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500
U.S. 352, 358-59, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1865-66 (1991)), cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 920 (1994).

In United States v.

Clemons, 843 F.2d 741 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835, 109
S. Ct. 97 (1988), we elaborated on the first step of a Batson
analysis, listing five factors that are relevant to a prima facie
case:

(1) the number of racial group members in the panel, (2)

the nature of the crime, (3) the race of the defendant and the
victim, (4) a pattern of strikes against racial group members,
and (5) the prosecution's questions and statements during the
voir dire.

Id. at 748.
By the time of the reconstruction hearings, eleven

years after Simmons' trial, defense counsel did not recall how
many African Americans were in the venire, how many were struck
by the prosecution, or how many were seated as jurors.

The

transcript from a pre-trial hearing held the day after the jury
had been selected, however, records defense counsel's estimate
that 130 potential jurors had been questioned.

Additionally,

trial transcripts disclose that, following an in-court

identification of Simmons, defense counsel stated:

"Let the

record reflect that he pointed to the defendant, Simmons.

The

only black male in the courtroom except for Mr. Jones, Juror
number 2."
The assistant prosecutor similarly did not remember the
total number of people in the venire, or its racial composition.
He testified during the reconstruction hearings that "there could
have been" as many as 20 African Americans, but that he did not
think "there would have been" as many as 40.

The assistant

prosecutor recalled juror number two, the foreperson of the jury,
as being an African American man, and he was "quite sure" that
there were other African American venirepersons besides juror
number two.

He did not know how many peremptory challenges he

used to strike African Americans from the jury.

The court

clerk's records reflect that both sides used all of their
peremptory challenges:

"Fourteen jurors in the box and all

challenges have been exhausted."
Simmons is African American and thus a member of a
cognizable racial group.

Based on his motion for a mistrial

"charging [the] State with systematically excluding blacks from
[the] jury," we conclude that the prosecution struck at least one
potential African American juror.

See Clemons, 843 F.2d at 747

(striking single juror could constitute prima facie case).

The

fact that juror number two was African American is not
dispositive.

See id. ("mere presence of a single black on the

jury would not necessarily prevent a finding of a prima facie
case").

It appears that between 20 and 40 other African

Americans may have been in the venire, although defense counsel
and the assistant prosecutor were unable to recall with
certainty.
The nature of the crime and its racial configuration -the murder and robbery of an elderly caucasian physician by a
young African American man -- contribute significantly to
Simmons' prima facie case.

See Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960, 971

(3d Cir. 1993) (considering substantive charge, "robbery of an
elderly white man by a black man," in analyzing defendant's prima
facie case).

Presumably recognizing the potential that the trial

would become racially charged, the judge specifically questioned
"jurors about the fact that the victim in this case was white,
[and] the defendant was black, [] attempting to ascertain whether
jurors would have any difficulty with this."

See also id. at 971

n.5 (noting that the trial court had asked the venire whether the
respective race of the defendant and alleged victim would affect
their judgment).
Although we cannot evaluate the last two Clemons
factors because transcripts of the voir dire are not available,
we conclude that Simmons has established a prima facie case of a
Batson violation.

The combination of Simmons' race, the

prosecution's exclusion of at least one potential African
American juror, and the circumstances surrounding the crime are
sufficient to meet Simmons' prima facie burden.

Thus, our focus

shifts to the prosecution and its ability to come forward with
race-neutral explanations for its peremptory challenges.
C.

In Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 92 S. Ct.
410 (1971), the Supreme Court reiterated that "[i]n all cases the
duty of the State is to provide the indigent as adequate and
effective an appellate review as that given appellants with
funds."

Id. at 193-94, 92 S. Ct. at 414 (quoting Draper v.

Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 496, 83 S. Ct. 774, 779 (1963)).

"In

terms of a trial record, this means that the State must afford
the indigent a record of sufficient completeness to permit proper
consideration of [his or her] claims."
414 (internal quotations omitted).

Id. at 194, 92 S. Ct. at

Although a full verbatim

transcript is not automatically required, the Mayer Court
concluded that an "appellant cannot be denied a 'record of
sufficient completeness' to permit proper consideration of his
claims."

Id. at 198, 92 S. Ct. at 416; see also Karabin v.

Petsock, 758 F.2d 966, 969 (3d Cir.) (holding that defendant must
show "colorable need" for complete transcript), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 857, 106 S. Ct. 163 (1985).
The problem here is self-evident.

No one recalls how

many potential African American jurors were peremptorily
challenged, and the assistant prosecutor does not remember and
has no notes indicating why he struck individual venirepersons.
Both parties agree that further reconstruction hearings would be
fruitless.

Simmons' Batson claim simply cannot be reviewed

without a transcript of the voir dire to allow the reviewing
court to examine whom the assistant prosecutor excluded and why.
We do not and cannot know whether Simmons' jury selection process
was infected by racial discrimination.

Nevertheless, Simmons raised a colorable claim that the
prosecution systematically excluded African Americans from the
jury, and the prejudice stemming from our inability to review
this claim is not fairly borne by him.5

The seriousness of this

claim and its potential merit demand some form of habeas relief.
As explained by the Batson Court, "[t]he core guarantee of equal
protection, ensuring citizens that their State will not
discriminate on account of race, would be meaningless were we to
approve the exclusion of jurors on the basis of such assumptions,
which arise solely from the jurors' race."
106 S. Ct. at 1723.

476 U.S. at 97-98,

It would be a grinding injustice to Simmons

were he to suffer at the hand of a prosecutor who practiced
racial discrimination through the use of peremptory challenges
and then contributed to a delay that shielded his actions from
review.

The potential harm extends beyond Simmons and the

excluded jurors:

"Selection procedures that purposefully exclude

black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the
fairness of our system of justice."

Id. at 87, 106 S. Ct. at

1718.
IV.
Simmons contends that the 13-year delay also violated
his right to due process and a speedy appeal, providing another

5

. The district court opinion granting Simmons a conditional
writ of habeas corpus details defense counsel's actions and nonactions with respect to obtaining trial transcripts and the
state's failure to preserve the necessary materials for preparing
transcripts. See Simmons v. Beyer, 689 F. Supp. 432, 448-49
(D.N.J. 1988).

basis for habeas relief.

It is axiomatic that once an appeal as

of right has been granted, "the procedures used in deciding
appeals must comport with the demands of the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution."

Evitts v. Lucey,

469 U.S. 387, 393, 105 S. Ct. 830, 834 (1985).

The

constitutional touchstone is that the appellate procedure must
furnish the components necessary for meaningful review.

See,

e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358, 83 S. Ct. 814,
817 (1963) (right to counsel on direct appeal); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20, 76 S. Ct. 585, 590-91 (1956) (right
to transcript on direct appeal).

Due process guarantees an

appeal that is both "adequate and effective."
at 392-94, 105 S. Ct. at 834-35.

Evitts, 469 U.S.

Since New Jersey provides for

an appeal as of right, N.J. Const. Art. 6, § 5, ¶ 2, we must
determine whether the 13-year delay constitutionally impaired the
appellate review that Simmons eventually received.
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly
recognized a criminal defendant's right to a speedy appeal, in
Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1987) (Burkett I),
we held that the Due Process Clause "guarantees a reasonably
speedy appeal if the state has chosen to give defendants the
right to [appeal]."

Id. at 1221.

Numerous other courts of

appeals have also acknowledged a due process right to a speedy
appeal.6
6

In Burkett I, we applied the criteria articulated in

. See, e.g., Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1558 (10th Cir.
1994); United States v. Tucker, 8 F.3d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 1993)
(en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 1230 (1994);
Cody v. Henderson, 936 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1991); United

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972), to
determine whether appellate delay had violated due process.

826

F.2d at 1222; accord Harris, 15 F.3d at 1559; Tucker, 8 F.3d at
676; Johnson, 732 F.2d at 381-82; Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 303.

In

Barker, the Supreme Court identified four factors to balance when
examining an alleged speedy trial violation:

"Length of delay,

the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right,
and prejudice to the defendant."
2192.

407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at

Although the interests at stake before trial and before

appeal obviously differ, they are sufficiently similar to warrant
the same general approach.

See Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25,

27, 94 S. Ct. 188, 190 (1973) (Barker factors may carry
"different weight where a defendant is incarcerated after
conviction"); Cody, 936 F.2d at 719 ("Barker factors should not
be applied uncritically" in speedy appeal context).
The 13-year delay in this case is an outrage, and that
Simmons' appeal as of right "slipped through the cracks" is
shameful.

See Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1225 (five and one-half

year delay in sentencing and appeal warranted discharge); cf.
Harris, 15 F.3d at 1560 (two-year appellate delay ordinarily
gives rise to a presumption of inordinate delay).

The subsequent

(..continued)
States v. Johnson, 732 F.2d 379, 381 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1033, 105 S. Ct. 505 (1984); United States v. Pratt, 645
F.2d 89, 91 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881, 102 S. Ct.
369 (1981); Rheuark v. Shaw, 628 F.2d 297, 302 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931, 101 S. Ct. 1392 (1981); cf. Allen v.
Duckworth, 6 F.3d 458, 459 (7th Cir. 1993) (assuming excessive
delay in appeal can violate due process), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
___, 114 S. Ct. 1106 (1994).

period of litigation marking Simmons' efforts to obtain a direct
appeal apparently took on a life of its own, without regard for
fundamental notions of fairness and due process.
The district court's finding that the reason for the
delay was ineffective assistance by appointed trial counsel and
the Public Defender is clearly correct.
Supp. at 443-44.

See Simmons, 689 F.

We recognize that "nominal representation on

appeal violates due process because 'a party whose counsel is
unable to provide effective representation is in no better
position than one who has no counsel at all.'"

Simmons v.

Reynolds, 898 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Evitts, 469
U.S. at 396, 105 S. Ct. at 836).

Responsibility for this delay

cannot be charged against Simmons, the victim of ineffective
lawyers.

See Harris, 15 F.3d at 1562 (delay caused by Public

Defender's inability to timely perfect an appeal should not be
attributed to petitioner); Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 531 (9th
Cir. 1990) ("failures of court-appointed counsel and delays by
the court are attributable to the state").

In contrast to his

lawyers' performance, Simmons himself timely requested and
diligently sought appellate review.

See Simmons, 689 F. Supp. at

435-36 (summarizing state court findings regarding Simmons'
actions).
Simmons has been undeniably prejudiced by the 13-year
delay.

In Burkett I, we adopted a modified version of the three

interests identified in Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S. Ct. at
2193, as being relevant to prejudice in a speedy trial context.

Accordingly, we assess prejudice in light of the following
interests in promoting timely appeals:
(1) prevention of oppressive incarceration pending
appeal; (2) minimization of anxiety and concern of
those convicted awaiting the outcome of their appeals;
and (3) limitation of the possibility that a convicted
person's grounds for appeal, and his or her defenses in
case of reversal and retrial, might be impaired.
Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1222 (quoting Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 303
n.8).
Here, the third factor is dispositive:

Simmons' claim

on appeal that the prosecution systematically excluded African
Americans from the jury is no longer reviewable.

This is not a

case in which deprivation of a timely appeal has engendered "the
possibility that a convicted person's grounds for appeal, and his
or her defenses in case of reversal and retrial might be
impaired."

Id. at 1225 (quoting Rheuark, 628 F.2d at 303 n.8).

Simmons has suffered actual prejudice because his Batson claim is
unreviewable on the reconstructed record.

Cf. United States v.

Wilson, 16 F.3d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 1994) (judicial bias claim
unreviewable because of long-delayed and woefully inadequate
trial transcript).

Moreover, an impediment to a ground for

appeal is the most serious form of prejudice "because the
inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his [or her] case
skews the fairness of the entire system."

Barker, 407 U.S. at

532, 92 S. Ct. at 2193.
Each Barker factor indicates that the 13-year appellate
delay violated Simmons' right to due process and a speedy appeal.
We agree with the district court that due process was violated,

but disagree that the violation was cured when the Appellate
Division granted him the right to appeal.
Supp. at 791.

See Simmons, 796 F.

If Simmons had received an adequate and effective,

though excessively delayed appeal, then the issue of prejudice
would become more difficult.7

However, the delay in this case

"substantially affect[ed] the fairness of the appellate
proceeding," Cody, 936 F.2d at 722, and we conclude that the due
process violation caused by the delay compels some form of habeas
relief.
V.
Having concluded that Simmons is entitled to relief for
both his potentially meritorious, but unreviewable, Batson claim
and his speedy appeal claim, we consider what relief is
appropriate.
7

The two violations are intertwined:

Simmons'

. See Heiser v. Ryan, 15 F.3d 299, 303-04 (3d Cir. 1994) (11½year delay in hearing motion to withdraw guilty plea did not
warrant habeas relief where petitioner's ability to show coercion
was not impaired), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. June 2, 1994)
(No. 93-9464); Harris, 15 F.3d at 1566 (once conviction affirmed,
no entitlement to habeas relief "unless the petitioner can show
actual prejudice to the appeal, itself, arising from the delay");
Tucker, 8 F.3d at 676 (despite three and one half year delay,
once his conviction was affirmed, petitioner received all he was
due from the legal process); Allen, 6 F.3d at 460 (despite a four
and one half year delay, habeas corpus action became moot once
petitioner's conviction was affirmed); Muwwakkil v. Hoke, 968
F.2d 284, 285 (2d Cir.) (13-year delay prior to direct appeal
does not warrant habeas relief where conviction was ultimately
affirmed because there was no actual prejudice), cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 664 (1992); Johnson, 732 F.2d at 382-83
(once appeal was heard and found lacking in merit, there was no
basis for ordering defendant's release). But cf. Doggett v.
United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2693 (1992)
("Thus we generally have to recognize that excessive delay
presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that
neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify.").

Batson claim eludes review because the delay in his direct appeal
resulted in the loss or destruction of the voir dire transcripts,
and his speedy appeal claim satisfies the prejudice requirement
because the delay impaired appellate review of his Batson claim.
In Heiser v. Ryan, 15 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 1994) cert.
denied, Heiser v. Stepenik, 115 S. Ct. 313 (1994), we asserted
that:

"One of the most troublesome issues that faces a federal

court sitting on a state prisoner's petition for habeas corpus is
the appropriate remedy to fashion when the state proceedings have
been characterized by excessive and indefensible delay."
300.

Id. at

Our task is "to fashion relief designed to rectify the

prejudice of the violation."

Burkett v. Fulcomer, 951 F.2d 1431,

1447 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 3055
(1992).
The usual remedy for a Batson violation is to grant a
petition for habeas corpus, but allow the state an opportunity to
retry the petitioner before a properly selected jury.

See Jones,

987 F.2d at 975 (remanding for district court "to grant the writ
without prejudice to the Commonwealth retrying the case");
Harrison v. Ryan, 909 F.2d 84, 88 (3d Cir.) (affirming order
"granting the petitioner's writ of habeas corpus and requiring
the Commonwealth to either retry the petitioner within 90 days or
release him"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1003, 111 S. Ct. 568
(1990).

Although Simmons has raised a hybrid Batson claim, which

draws on equal protection and due process concepts and is based
on our inability to review his Batson allegations, we believe
that the same remedy should apply.

For a speedy trial violation,

the typical remedy seeks "to counteract any resulting prejudice
demonstrated by a petitioner."

Burkett I, 826 F.2d at 1222.

Thus, we recognize that a "discharge is warranted where
attempting an alternate remedy would not vitiate the prejudice of
the fundamental unfairness or would itself violate a petitioner's
constitutional rights."

Id. (citations omitted).

"[H]abeas courts ordinarily have fashioned a remedy
designed to spur the state courts to fulfilling their
constitutional obligations to the defendant."
306 (citations omitted).

Heiser, 15 F.3d at

Here, Simmons' right to a jury

selection process that is untainted by racial discrimination is
at the core of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection.

Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S. Ct. at 1723.

Accordingly, the constitutional integrity of his current
confinement is seriously in question.

Given the monumental delay

in this case and Simmons' constitutionally suspect incarceration,
we have considered whether an unconditional release would be
appropriate.

Our difficulty lies in our inability to know

whether the prosecution, in fact, systematically excluded African
Americans from the jury.

If it were possible to review Simmons'

Batson claim, and it were found to be without merit, then the
prejudice stemming from the delay alone would be a slender reed
on which to support his unconditional release.

See Simmons, 898

F.2d at 869 ("Release from custody is an extraordinary remedy,
especially in a delay-of-appeal case where release would in
effect nullify a state court conviction on grounds unrelated to
the merits of the case.").

We conclude that the relief best

tailored to remedy the prejudice Simmons has suffered is a new
trial and fair jury selection process.

VI.
Therefore, we will reverse the judgment of the district
court and remand the cause for it to grant Simmons' petition for
a writ of habeas corpus, give the state an opportunity to retry
Simmons, and specify the time period within which the state must
retry or release him.

Simmons v. Beyer
No. 93-5370

HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judge, Concurring.

In this difficult case, I believe the Court correctly
applies Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), to Simmons's preBatson conviction, even though Simmons raises it in a collateral
attack on his state conviction.

Compare Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S.

255 (1986) (per curiam) (courts should not retroactively apply
new criminal procedure rule on collateral review of convictions
becoming final before the new rule is announced) and Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (same) with Griffith v. Kentucky, 479
U.S. 314 (1987) (courts should retroactively apply a new rule of

criminal procedure to those cases pending on direct review or not
yet final when the new rule is announced).

I, therefore, concur

in the result.
I agree with the majority that this case is made more
difficult because the reconstructed record is inadequate to
review fully the Batson issue.8

This particular difficulty

implies that Batson's retroactive application to Simmons's case
is important to the grant of the new trial remedy, which we all
agree Simmons should be afforded.

The precise retroactivity

problem this case presents, however, has never been directly
before us or the Supreme Court.

I write separately because this

important and unique retroactivity issue warrants an analysis.
Like the majority, I am reluctant to hold that the
State's delay in hearing Simmons's appeal, in and of itself,

8

. After concluding that Batson applies, the majority then
recognizes a "self-evident" problem; i.e., it cannot decide the
Batson issue because
[n]o one recalls how many potential African
American jurors were peremptorily challenged,
and the assistant prosecutor does not
remember and has no notes indicating why he
struck individual venirepersons. Both
parties agree that further reconstruction
hearings would be fruitless. Simmons' Batson
claim simply cannot be reviewed without a
transcript of the voir dire to allow the
reviewing court to examine whom the assistant
prosecutor excluded and why. We do not and
cannot know whether Simmons' jury selection
process was infected by racial
discrimination.
See Majority Op. at 15. Simmons, indeed, concedes as much.
Brief for Appellant Brief at 26.

See

establishes sufficient prejudice permitting us to conclude, as a
matter of law, that his general due process right to a speedy
appeal has been violated.
20-21.

See Opinion of Court, typescript at

My decision, thus, rests not only upon the determination

that this court should apply Batson, but also on two other
critical factors; namely, the State's inordinate delay in
granting Simmons's right of appeal and the partial loss of
certain voir dire transcripts.9

It is the concurrent existence

of these three factorsincluding the sad failure of New
Jersey's otherwise generally efficient judicial system to provide
Simmons with a reasonably prompt and adequate appeal of his 1977
murder conviction that allows us to grant the remedy of a new
trial.
The first factor is the State's excessive delay, nearly
fourteen years, in granting Simmons's right of appeal.

As we

held in Burkett, 826 F.2d at 1221, a state's delay in affording a
convicted person a direct appeal, as of right, may violate his
general Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, as opposed to
the more specific Sixth Amendment speedy trial right available to
9

. At the very least, this rationale avoids any need to remand
this case for further fact finding on the prejudice issue. See
Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 771 (3d Cir. 1993) (remand for
further fact finding on cause of delay relating to speedy trial
issue); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208, 1227 (3d Cir. 1987)
(remand on one of three convictions to make a determination
concerning prejudice). Any further delay in this case is
undesirable. Hence, like the majority, I favor simplifying the
prejudice issue by avoiding reliance solely on the delay Simmons
has suffered. See Majority Op. at 20-21 ("If Simmons had
received an adequate and effective, though excessively delayed
appeal, then the issue of prejudice would become more
difficult.").

state prisoners under the incorporation doctrine.

Id. at 1219.

In Burkett, we partially analogized the right to a speedy appeal
with the right to a speedy trial, but modified speedy appeal
analysis to emphasize the importance of a finding of prejudice.
Instead of prejudice being merely a key factor or the "most
important factor," see Hakeem, 990 F.2d at 760, we stated that
"prejudice is generally a necessary . . . element of a due
process claim."

Burkett, 826 F.2d at 1221 (quoting United States

v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977)).

In adapting the

"prejudice" factor to the judgment of appellate delays, we then
delineated three interests that are protected by prompt appeals:
(1) prevention of oppressive incarceration
pending appeal; (2) minimization of anxiety
and concern of those convicted awaiting the
outcome of their appeals; and (3) limitation
of the possibility that a convicted person's
grounds for appeal, and his or her defenses
in case of reversal and retrial, might be
impaired.

Id. at 1222.
Having made these observations, we nevertheless refused
to hold that an on-going, combined delay of at least five years
and three months in sentencing Burkett and processing his appeal
established prejudice as a matter of law as to one of his three
convictions.

Id. at 1227.

Instead, we remanded Burkett's case

to the district court for fact finding as to prejudice and
thereafter for balancing the degree of prejudice, if any, with
the other Barker factors to determine whether Burkett's right to
a speedy appeal had been violated.

Id.; see Barker v. Wingo, 407

U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (enunciating four factors to consider in
speedy trial analysis).
The second critical factor in this case concerns the
loss of the transcript relating to the voir dire of Simmons's
jurors before he received his direct appeal nunc pro tunc as a
result of his federal habeas petition.

This partial loss of the

transcript is material on prejudice only if Batson applies
retroactively to Simmons's case.10

The majority relies on the

loss of this part of the trial transcript in holding that this
case involves prejudice as a matter of law.
fact weighs heavily.

I, too, believe this

It permits us easily to conclude that the

reconstructed record is inadequate to afford Simmons an adequate
and effective appeal.
majority states:

See Majority Op. at 15.

Thus, the

"we cannot evaluate the last two Clemons

factors because transcripts of the voir dire are not
available. . . ."

Majority Op. at 14; see United States v.

Clemons, 843 F.2d 741 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 835
(1988).11
10

. It is the inability to review the Batson issue, not a
violation of Batson itself, that is material to our finding of
prejudice in this case. Simmons also argues that the loss of the
voir dire and other transcript parts affected his ability to
establish that his trial in the Patterson vicinage was
constitutionally unfair entitling him to have his motions for a
venue or venire change granted. I believe this argument lacks
merit and, like the majority, am unable to discern any other
issue Simmons has raised for which the reconstructed record is
inadequate. See Majority Op. at 2 n.1.
11

. Interestingly, the majority then concludes that the
reconstructed record is sufficient to show a prima facie Batson
claim. See Majority Op. at 14. In so concluding, I believe the
majority goes beyond Simmons's argument. As I read his brief, he

Thus, as noted, it is clear that Batson's retroactive
application to this collateral attack on Simmons's pre-Batson
conviction is essential to our mandate requiring New Jersey to
grant Simmons a new trial within a reasonable time, to be
determined by the district court, or release him.

I turn now to

an analysis of the retroactivity issue.
In Griffith, the text of the Supreme Court's holding
states that Batson is to be applied to all cases "pending on
direct review or not yet final" at the time Batson was decided.
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328.

Additionally, the Griffith court

stated that "final" "mean[s] a case in which a judgment of
conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal
exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or
a petition for certiorari finally denied."
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
258 n.1 (citation omitted).

Id. at 321 n.6

Accord Allen, 478 U.S. at

Because of the inordinate delay in

Simmons's appeal that is attendant upon the circumstances of this
case, he had not yet "exhausted" the "availability of appeal"
when Batson was decided.

In fact, his direct appeal, which took

place after Batson, was not decided until nearly fourteen years
after he was convicted, albeit only nunc pro tunc, as a result of
the district court's earlier order in this habeas proceeding.
(..continued)
argues he cannot make a prima facie showing of a Batson violation
on the reconstructed record. See Brief of Appellant at 26.
Whether we analyze Simmons's case on the basis of this concession
or, as the majority does, it is the deficiency in the
reconstructed record with respect to the voir dire transcript
that establishes irremediable prejudice to Simmons.

It can at least be argued, however, that literal
application of Griffith's text to Simmons's case is in tension
with one of the Griffith rationales.

Simmons is not similarly

situated to Batson, Griffith, or Brown (the petitioner whose case
the Supreme Court consolidated with Griffith).

Rather, Simmons,

convicted in December 1977 of a brutal murder on strong but not
overwhelming evidence, is a "chance beneficiary" of counsel's
failure to secure him the timely, direct appeal that the State of
New Jersey grants as a matter of right to all persons convicted
of a crime.12

See Griffith, 479 U.S. at 327.

Griffith, Brown,

and Batson were tried in the same court within three months of
each other.

Id.

The same prosecutor presented the State's case

against all three and appears to have used peremptory challenges
to deny them the right to be judged by an impartial jury, from
which no person was excluded because of race.

Id.

Simmons was tried almost ten years before Batson was
even decided.

Except for his counsels' inattention, his appeal

would have been filed in January 1978, within 45 days of his
conviction or, at least, no more than 30 days thereafter.13

And,

12

. Once a state gives a convicted criminal defendant a right to
appeal, the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause requires the
State to provide an adequate means, including effective
assistance of counsel, to process the appeal. See Evitts v.
Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
13

. New Jersey Rule 2:4-4(a) permits its appellate courts to
extend the time for appeal by 30 days. Compare New Jersey R.
2:4-4(a) (1995) ("The appellate court, upon a showing of good
cause and the absence of prejudice, may extend the time fixed by
R. 2:4-1(a) (final judgment) . . . for a period not exceeding 30
days, but only if the notice of appeal or notice of petition for
certification was in fact served and filed within the time as

with the consequent likelihood that the appellate process would
have been completed long before Batson, Simmons's conviction
would have become unassailable.14
I do not believe it can fairly be said that Simmons,
unlike Griffith or Brown, will suffer from any "actual inequity"
if Batson's new rule is not retroactively applied to his 1977
conviction.

See Griffith, 479 U.S. at 327-28.

Whatever

inequities may exist press upon other persons who were convicted
by juries from which African Americans were shamefully excluded
and then had those convictions affirmed in timely appeals before
Batson was decided, or perhaps the people of New Jersey who may
fail to understand how a person convicted of direct participation
in the brutal murder of an elderly doctor, who ventured into the
streets in the middle of the night to respond to an emergency, is
afforded a new trial or released.
Indeed, at first glance it might appear that Simmons
has been saved by the legal fiction of an appeal nunc pro tunc
(..continued)
extended.") with Notice to Appellate Bar, 100 N.J.L.J. 1208
(1977) ("The Supreme Court has directed the Appellate Division to
relax Rule 2:4-4(a) in favor of allowing an out-of-time appeal
nunc pro tunc on behalf of an indigent criminal defendant in any
case where it satisfactorily appears that the defendant,
personally, within time, requested his trial counsel or the
Public Defender's Office to file an appeal on his behalf.").
Unfortunately, the State did not appreciate the need to relax the
strict time limits on appeal with respect to Simmons's case. If
it had, this habeas proceeding might well have been avoided.
14

. I use the term "unassailable" because I agree with
that none of the issues Simmons has raised, except his
process-equal protection claim based on Batson and the
inability to afford him adequate appellate review in a
fashion, have merit. See Majority Op. at 2 n.1.

the Court
hybrid due
State's
timely

that is no less a fiction because it is stated in a dead, ancient
language.15

Put simply, direct review was still available in

Simmons's case when Batson was decided only as a result of a
federal court's collateral review of his state court conviction
which otherwise had every appearance of finality.
In addition, literal application of the Griffith
holding to Simmons's case creates tension between Griffith, which
espoused a bright line rule favoring retroactivity in all cases
that are "pending on direct review or not yet final," and Teague,
where the Supreme Court barred retroactive application of Batson,
and other cases wherein a new constitutional principle of
criminal procedure that clearly breaks with past precedent is
announced, to cases on collateral review.16

Here, but for the

collateral attack, which Simmons successfully pursued in this
federal habeas proceeding, his New Jersey conviction would have
almost certainly been "final" before Batson was decided.

15

. This particular fictitious form of time travel may merely
reflect the vestigial survival of the common law rule that courts
lack jurisdiction to hear an untimely appeal. It fails, however,
to disguise the fact that Simmons's conviction had every
appearance of finality long before Batson, but is now subject to
review only by virtue of this collateral proceeding.
16

. The two exceptions espoused in Teague, which require the
retroactive application of a new rule if it (1) "places 'certain
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of
the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,'" Teague, 489
U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692
(1972) (Harlan, J., concurring)), and (2) "implicate[s] the
fundamental fairness of the trial" and factual innocence, id. at
312, do not apply here.

Griffith itself did not directly address the problem of
applying Batson to nunc pro tunc appeals.

As a result, it is

arguably distinguishable on its facts from Simmons's case.
Indeed, Griffith, Allen, and Teague are all factually
distinguishable from Simmons's case.

Nevertheless, I think

Griffith should be applied to this and all other cases involving
appeals nunc pro tunc, not only because such a decision comports
with a literal reading of Griffith's holding, but also because of
Griffith's genesis in Justice Harlan's objections to the case
specific approach to retroactivity adopted in Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).

See Mackey v. United States, 401

U.S. 667 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The application of new rules to any case pending on
direct review when the rule is announced, including appeals nunc
pro tunc resulting from a collateral attack on a conviction,
seems to me to represent a reasonable compromise between the
unfairness incident to retroactive application of any procedural
rule to trial proceedings concluded before the new rule is
announced and the temptation of legislative free wheeling that
courts confront when they are permitted prospectively to apply
new departures in the law.

Moreover, the application of new law

to appeals nunc pro tunc does not seem to be inconsistent with
the views of Justice Harlan or that of Justice Powell in his
concurrence in Griffith, which states:
It is to be hoped that the Court then will
adopt the Harlan view of retroactivity in
cases seeking relief on habeas petitions.

Under that view, habeas petitions generally
should be judged according to the
constitutional standards existing at the time
of conviction.

Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328 (Powell, J., concurring).17
It is perhaps unfortunate that retroactive application
of Batson is required to grant Simmons any effective relief.18
His only viable constitutional claim, which the Court describes
as a hybrid equal protection-due process claim, results from a
combination of the Batson problem, New Jersey's long delay in
granting Simmons his right to appeal, and the consequent loss of
part of the trial transcript material to Batson.

Nevertheless, I

am satisfied with the result reached by the Court.

Accordingly,

I concur with its decision to vacate the district court's order
denying Simmons's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and remand
with instructions conditionally to grant the writ, unless the
State grants Simmons a new trial within a reasonable time, to be
determined by the district court.
17

. In his reference to Justice Harlan's view on retroactivity,
Justice Powell may be using the term "convicted" interchangeably
with the term "final." See Mackey, 401 U.S. at 682-83 (Harlan,
J. concurring); see also Griffith, 479 U.S. at 329 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (new constitutional rules governing criminal
prosecutions should not apply in collateral proceedings
challenging convictions that become final before the rule is
announced).
18

. It is doubly unfortunate because neither Simmons himself nor
the State had given us any analysis of the retroactivity problem
and, by his reliance on State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150 (N.J.
1986) (New Jersey's Batson analogue), which plainly does not
apply to Simmons's case, this Court, the state appellate court,
and the district court have all been left without the benefit of
any real advocacy concerning retroactivity as it applies to
appeals nunc pro tunc.

